UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-25-2016

Rish v. Home Depot Respondent's Brief Dckt.
43677

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Rish v. Home Depot Respondent's Brief Dckt. 43677" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6125.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6125

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CHANNEL (BLACKER) RISH,
Claimant/ Appellant;
V.

THE HOME DEPOT, INC., Employer, and
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF THE STATE
OF PENNSYLVANIA, Surety,
Defendants/Respondents.

)
)

)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 43677

)
)
)
)
)

RESPONDENTS' (EMPLOYER/SURETY) BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS OFF ACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER ENTERED BY THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ON THE 23RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2015
Chairman RD Maynard, Presiding

W. Scott Wigle, ISB #2802
Bowen & Bailey, LLP
1311 W. Jefferson St.
PO Box 1007
Boise, Idaho 83701

Paul T. Curtis, ISB #6042
Curtis & Porter, PA
598 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Attorneys for Respondents (Employer/Surety)

Attorneys for Appellant (Claimant)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CHANNEL (BLACKER) RISH,
Claimant/Appellant,
V.

)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 43677

)

THE HOME DEPOT, INC., Employer, and
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF THE STATE
OF PENNSYLVANIA, Surety,
Defendants/Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)

RESPONDENTS' (EMPLOYER/SURETY) BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER ENTERED BY THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ON THE 23RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2015
Chairman RD Maynard, Presiding

W. Scott Wigle, ISB #2802
Bowen & Bailey, LLP
1311 W. Jefferson St.
PO Box 1007
Boise, Idaho 83701

Paul T. Curtis, ISB #6042
Curtis & Porter, PA
598 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Attorneys for Respondents (Employer/Surety)

Attorneys for Appellant (Claimant)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents .................................................................. ..................... i
Table of Cases and Authority .................................................................. ....... ii
I.

IL

Statement of the Case ................................................................. ....... 1
A.

Nature of the Case ................................................................. .. 1

B.

Course of Proceedings .............................................................. 2

C.

Statement of Facts ................................................................. .. 3

Argument. .................................................................. .................... 12
A.

The Standard ofReview ............................................................. 12

B.

Some Perspective on Claimant's Condition and Her Claim ................... 14

C.

The Commission Did Not Misinterpret Chavez v. Stokes ..................... .. 16

D.

The Commission's Finding on Medical Treatment is Supported by
Substantial and Competent Evident ................................................ 19

E.

The Argument Regarding Dr. Burks is a Red Herring .......................... 24

III.

Conclusion ................................................................. .................... 26

IV.

Certificate of Service ................................................................. ........ 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Chavez v. Stokes,_ Idaho_, 353 P.3d 414 (2015) ............................... 13, 16, 17, 18, 19
Eacret v. Clearwater Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 737, 40 P.3d 91, 95 (2002) .................... 13
Edmondson v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 108,937 P.2d 420 (1997) .... 16
Evanston Hospital v. Hauck, 1 F.3d 540,543 (7th Cir. 1993) ......................................... 16
Fife v. The Home Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 513, 260 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2011) ................ 12
Gomez v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597,601,273 P.3d 569,573 (2012) ......................... 13
Henderson, 142 Idaho at 565, 130 P.3d at 1103 ......................................................... 14
Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet and Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 859 P.2d 330 (1993) .................... 17
Knowltonv. Wood River Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 135, 140,254P.2d36,41 (2011) .................. 12
Lizer v. Eagle Air Med Corp., 308 F.Supp2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2004) ................................. )6
Lopez v. State, 136 Idaho 174, 178, 30 P.3d 952, 956 (2001) .......................................... 14
McAlpin v. Wood River Med. Ctr., 129 Idaho 1, 3,921 P.2d 178, 180 (1996) ..................... .12
McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 152 Idaho 582, 584-5, 272 P.3d 554, 556-57 (2012) .............. .12
Neel v. Western Construction Inc. 147 Idaho 146, 206 P .3d 852 (2009) ............................. 16
Rybicki v. Hartley, 792 F.2d 260,261 (1st Cir. 1986) .................................................. 16
Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 779 P.2d 395 (1989) ............... 17, 18
Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Idaho 133, 136, 666 P.2d 1144,
1147 (1983) .......................................................................................... 12
Walters v. All Phase Const., 156 Idaho 259,332 P.3d 992 (2014) ................................ 13, 14

11

v. Williams

157 Idaho

1263 (2014) ...

Zapata v. J.R. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999) ..................... .12

OTHER AUTHORITIES
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (25) (c) .............................................................................. 16
42 C.F.R. § 447.15 .......................................................................................... .16
National Institute on Drug Abuse, American's Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and

Prescription Drug Abuse, presented by Nora D. Volkow, M.D., May 14, 2014 .......... .14

lll

I. STATEMENTOFTHECASE
A. Nature of the Case
is an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission in a workers'
compensation case. Claimant Channel Rish ("Claimant") twisted her right knee while working
as a cashier for The Home Depot ("Employer"). The Employer and its workers' compensation
surety, Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania ("Surety'), accepted Claimant's claim and
paid appropriate medical and time loss benefits while she recovered from her injury. When she
was rated for permanent physical impairment by her treating orthopedic surgeon, Employer and
Surety paid the appropriate permanent physical impairment benefits.
Even after Claimant had reached medical stability, the Defendants continued to pay for
additional medical care to address her continuing pain complaints. This treatment principally
involved the receipt of narcotic pain medications prescribed by a "pain management" physician.
After a number of months, when it became clear that the treatment was not providing any benefit
to Claimant, the Defendants (with medical support) ceased paying for additional treatment.
Thereafter, for a period of several months Claimant was narcotic-free. She then relapsed and got
back on opioid pain medications. For the past few years she's been getting her drugs from
another pain management physician who is reimbursed by Medicaid.
In this workers' compensation case Claimant alleged that the Defendants were
responsible for payment for additional medical treatment, specifically continuing narcotic
medications and the costs of implantation of a spinal stimulator device. Claimant also sought to
recover additional income benefits for disability in excess of the impairment benefits previously
paid.
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The Commission determined that Claimant was not entitled to recover either additional
benefits or additional income benefits.

the Commission's decision, the

Defendants have in fact paid significantly more benefits than Claimant was entitled to under her
workers' compensation claim.
Claimant appeals from the Commission's decision, asserting that the Commission erred
m its conclusion that Claimant was not entitled to additional medical benefits.

The

Commission's decision regarding income benefits is not challenged on appeal.
B. Course of Proceedings

Claimant filed her Workers' Compensation Complaint on February 26, 2010. The
Complaint (R. p.2) sought payment for past medical expenses, future medical expenses and
income benefits for permanent partial disability. The Defendants answered Claimant's
Complaint on March 18, 2010.

Defendants' Answer admitted that Claimant's workers'

compensation claim was compensable and that she had been entitled to the medical benefits,
temporary disability benefits and the permanent physical impairment benefits that had been
previously paid. (R. p.5).
The case was assigned to Referee Douglas Donahue, who conducted a hearing in Idaho
Falls on August 26, 2014. At the hearing, the exhibits offered by the parties were admitted into
evidence. (Tr. p. 9). The Referee heard testimony from Claimant Channel Rish (Tr. pp.40-124)
and from her mother Donna Rish (Tr. pp.17-39). Thereafter, Claimant's attorney took the posthearing depositions of Jason Poston MD, Carol Anderson PhD and vocational consultant Kent
Granat. Defendants took the post-hearing depositions of vocational consultant Mary BarrosBailey PhD and Gary Walker MD.
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After reviewing the evidence, the Referee authored his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Recommendation. (R. pp.10-44). The Referee's Findings and Conclusions were
adopted by the Commission in its Order deciding the case, entered on September 23, 2015 (R.
pp.45-46).

I

In the decision, the Referee and the Commission found that Claimant was entitled to
medical benefits related to her injury up until August 9, 2007, when she was found to have
reached medical stability and that she was not entitled to medical benefits thereafter. The Referee
and the Commission further held that Claimant was not entitled to additional temporary
disability benefits, that she was entitled to permanent physical impairment benefits of 5% of the
whole person (which had been previously paid) and that she was not entitled to benefits for
permanent disability in excess of her impairment. (R. pp.45-46).
On October 29, 2015 Claimant filed her Notice of Appeal (R. pp.47-51). The appeal is
timely. The Notice of Appeal challenges the Commission's ruling with regard to Claimant's
entitlement to medical treatment. (R. p.49). Appellant's Opening Brief does not specify what
relief is being sought from this Court. Presumably, Claimant wants to have the Court remand the
case to the Commission for reconsideration of the medical issues.

C. Statement of Facts
Appellant's Opening Brief provides the Court with little information regarding the factual
background of this case and the course of Claimant's medical treatment subsequent to her
industrial accident. Defendants believe that this information is essential to an understanding of
the Industrial Commission's decision and therefore supply the following discussion.

1

The Commission's Order was signed by two of the three Commissioners, with Commissioner Thomas Baskin
having recused himself from the case. Commissioner Baskin had provided legal advice to the Surety's adjuster,
before he took his position as a Commissioner.
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Claimant Channel Rish was born on
grew up

At the time of the hearing she was 35

Idaho Falls with both

parents and

brother.

Claimant had a troubled adolescence. She was diagnosed with a seizure disorder for which
she required medication. (Tr. pp.17, 18).

She had behavioral problems that became a serious

concern for her parents. Her mother described her "not fitting in" at school. She was put into an
alternative school but dropped out. (Tr. p.20). She would run away and on occasion would get in
trouble with the police. (Tr. pp. I 8, 19).
The situation led to two in-patient psychiatric hospitalizations. (Tr. p.31 ). The diagnosis
was depression. (Tr. p.37).
Claimant did manage to complete high school and she obtained a diploma. She left home at
age 18 to get married. (Tr. p.20). The marriage lasted about 5 Yz years and produced two children
who live with Claimant. (Def's Ex. A, Claimant's depo. p.9).
Claimant's medical history is significant for problems with her right knee. She was treated
for right knee problems involving pain and swelling with fluid buildup. As a teenager, she was
examined by her family doctor, who referred to her right knee problems as "chronic" and prescribed
a brace. (Def's Ex. K p.126). Claimant's medical history is also significant for a prior work injury
to her right hand, incurred a few months before coming to work for The Home Depot. This led to
surgery on Claimant's index finger on January 15, 2005 and a lengthy period of recovery during
which she was taking prescription pain medications. (see Claimant's Ex. 23).
Claimant's industrial accident at The Home Depot happened more than 10 years ago on
October 30, 2005. She walked around a counter and slipped on a fatigue mat, injuring her right
knee. (Tr. p.52). In retrospect, it is easy to see that Claimant's response to this incident was
immediately and consistently out of proportion to the injury. She was seen at the local emergency
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room after the accident and the doctor there could not do a complete examination of the knee
because

Claimant's extreme

complaints. Because of that, the only diagnosis he could make

was simply "knee injury." (Ex. 1 p.3). When she followed up with her family doctor, she again
exhibited pain complaints that were so severe that an examination could not be accomplished. The
diagnosis was "sprain."

The doctor prescribed hydrocodone, an opioid pain medication.

(Claimant's Ex. 2. p.2).
Claimant was referred to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Casey Huntsman of Idaho Falls. She
saw Dr. Huntsman a little more than a week after the accident. At that time her pain complaints
were still extreme and it made it difficult for Dr. Huntsman to do a complete examination. (see Ex.
3. pp.1-2). Because he couldn't get a good assessment of what was going on with Claimant's knee
from the examination, he ordered an MRI.
The MRI scan was done at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center on November 17, 2005.
(Ex. 1, p.4). The results were very benign. All of the major structures of the knee were intact and
normal. The only potential exception to that was that the radiologist could not "absolutely exclude"
a subtle tear of the medial meniscus. (Ex. 1, p.4). Given these MRI findings Dr. Huntsman was not
anxious to do surgery. When he saw Claimant in follow-up he advised her on some home exercises
and asked her to check back with him in four weeks to see how she was doing. (Ex. 3 p.3).
However, on December 2, 2005 Claimant was back to the emergency room at EIRMC,
seeking pain medication. (Ex. 1, p.5).

After Claimant returned to Dr. Huntsman he authored a

record reciting that Claimant was continuing to have problems with her knee and that she was
"strongly soliciting surgical intervention." (Ex. 1 p. l 0). Dr. Huntsman took Claimant to surgery on
December 14, 2005. He performed an arthroscopic procedure on the knee, looking for a possible
medial meniscus tear. He did not find one. Dr. Huntsman's operative report discusses his
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observations at surgery of the principal structures of the knee. These were all in good shape. (Ex. 1

Unfortunately, Claimant's pain complaints continued and Dr. Huntsman ended up doing two
additional procedures on Claimant's knee, on August 16, 2006 and again on May 18, 2007 (Ex 5
pp.2-5).

Neither of these surgeries revealed any physiological reason for Claimant's pain

complaints, nor did they resolve those complaints. During the course of his treatment of Claimant,
Dr. Huntsman had been prescribing the opioid medication hydrocodone. When Dr. Huntsman saw
Claimant on June 28, 2007, he noted that he was giving her "the last hydrocodone prescription
today." (Ex. 3 p.21 ). Claimant responded to this by finding another doctor for her medications.
In July 2007 Claimant started receiving her medications from a "pain management"
physician in Idaho Falls, Dr. Holly Zoe. Dr. Zoe treated Claimant with various forms of opioid pain
medications, primarily Fentanyl and oxycodone. (Ex. 6). These medications did not resolve
Claimant's pain complaints.
On August 9, 2007 Claimant saw Dr. Huntsman in follow-up after her last surgery. Dr.
Huntsman examined Claimant and found that her patella was mobile, there was no swelling, the
knee was stable and her sensory and motor nerves were intact. He determined that Claimant had
reached maximum medical improvement with regard to her knee injury. He rated her for permanent
impairment, finding a 3% whole person permanent physical impairment. (Ex 3 p.23). On August
30, 2007 Dr. Huntsman addressed permanent work restrictions in correspondence with a vocational
consultant employed by the Industrial Commission. Dr. Huntsman released Claimant to return to
her time-of-injury job, noting that "objectively, there are no work restrictions ...." He went on to
note that subjectively, Claimant continued to complain of pain and that she believed she had
significant work restrictions. (Def s Ex. C p.51 ). Dr. Huntsman had nothing more to offer Claimant.
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He noted that she was seeing Dr. Zoe, the pain management doctor and he offered a concurrence in
that treatment. Probably because

that, the Employer and Surety continued to pay for Claimant's

medical treatment after she had been found medicaliy stable. In fact, the Employer and Surety paid
for Claimant's palliative medical care for nearly 2 additional years, during which time Claimant
received continuing prescriptions for narcotic pain medications and various injection therapies,
which did not improve her condition. (see Ex. 6).
By late 2007 Dr. Zoe was suggesting the possibility of a spinal stimulation trial. (Ex. 6 p.8).
This prompted the Employer and Surety to schedule independent medical examinations with Drs.
Robert Friedman and Christian Gussner of Idaho Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. They saw
Claimant on January 9 and 10, 2008, to diagnose her condition and offer treatment
recommendations. Dr. Gussner felt that Claimant had suffered a simple knee sprain in her industrial
accident of October 2005. He thought she had chronic knee pain of unclear etiology. He did not
believe that Claimant was in need of spinal stimulation or other interventional pain therapies. His
recommendation was that Claimant attend a chronic pain management program offered through
Idaho Elks Rehabilitation Hospital. The purpose of this would have been to restore Claimant's
function while getting her off of opioid medications. (Defs Ex. L p.294). Dr. Friedman, who
examined Claimant separately, made a similar recommendation. He too thought that Claimant
needed to be detoxified from narcotics. He saw no need for spinal stimulation and no need for any
further orthopedic intervention. (Ex. L p.296-301). Drs. Gussner and Friedman assessed Claimant's
permanent physical impairment at 5% of the whole person. (Ex. L p.308).
Following these IMEs Claimant was offered an opportunity to attend the recommended
program at the Elks Hospital in Boise. She did not participate in the program. Claimant testified at
the hearing that this was because the surety refused to pay for her child care. (Tr. p.59). In fact,
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Claimant sabotaged the effort to have her attend this program by demanding a large advance
payment of child care expense. The surety refused this demand and Claimant did not attend the
program. (see Defs Ex. L p.311).
For an additional year Claimant continued to get her narcotic pain medications, primarily
Fentanyl and hydrocodone, through Dr. Zoe, at the Defendants' expense. She also had lumbar
sympathetic injections that were not helpful. (see Ex. 6 pp.33-37).
In January 2009 Claimant returned to Boise for a panel examination by Dr. Christian
Gussner and psychologist Michael McClay PhD. Claimant told Dr. Gussner that her knee was no
better and that her pain was "exactly the same." (Def' s Ex. L p.310). He was unable to detect any
ongoing problem with Claimant's right knee, nor did he see any evidence of complex regional pain
syndrome (CRPS), which had been suggested as a possibility by Dr. Zoe. Dr. Gussner thought that
Claimant had probably strained her knee in the work injury on October 30, 2005 but he noted that
the subsequent MRI scan three weeks later was essentially normal. Dr. Gussner' s continuing
recommendation was that Claimant taper and discontinue her opioid medications, which would
have occurred had she attended the Elks Hospital program. (Def's Ex L pp.310-313).
The psychologist, Dr. McClay noted Claimant had a long history of personal problems and
medical problems that led to elements of chronic pain syndrome, depression, anxiety and symptom
magnification syndrome. Dr. McClay's primary recommendation was that Claimant "needs to be
out of the workers' compensation process as quickly as possible." (Def's Ex M, p. 318).
The results of the panel examination were sent to Dr. Zoe. She decided to begin titrating
down Claimant's narcotic pain medications. When Claimant was informed of this in an appointment
on May 1, 2009 she reacted (according to Dr. Zoe's records) by becoming very angry and
screaming at the doctor.

This ended their relationship. Claimant was given prescriptions for
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to

and instructions on tapering the use

the medication. (Ex. 6

She never

Zoe.

The Employer and Surety ceased paying for additional treatment at this point
Claimant has testified that she was able to discontinue use of narcotic pain medications
thereafter, for a period of a few months. (Tr. p. l 08). Unfortunately, she relapsed. In September 2009
he saw her family doctor who gave her a prescription for codeine (Tylenol 3), but she was soon
back on hydrocodone. (Def's Ex. K p.170). Claimant's family doctor, evidently thinking that there
was a physical explanation for Claimant's knee pain, referred her for another orthopedic
examination.
She saw orthopedic surgeon John Liljenquist MD in July 2010. He had some x-rays done
that showed no evidence of abnormalities. He thought Claimant might benefit from some exercises
and maybe anti-inflammatory medications but he ruled out the need for any further surgery. (Ex. 9
p.4).

Dr. Liljinquist, who had no reason to see Claimant again, suggested the "new pain

management specialist in town," Jason Poston MD. (Id.) By this point, Claimant had burned her
bridges with Dr. Zoe, the surety had ceased financing Claimant's drug habit and she was getting her
medications through Medicaid.
Dr. Poston has been seeing Claimant since September 2, 2010. So far as we know he
continues to prescribe her medications to this date. Dr. Poston has provided Claimant with
continuing prescriptions for narcotic pain medications, done a series of lumbar sympathetic blocks
and had Claimant undergo a neurosurgical procedure for implantation of a spinal cord stimulator.
None of these interventions have resolved Claimant's pain complaints or led her to become
more functional. In fact, the reverse has occurred. At the time of the hearing, Claimant was
significantly less functional than she was before Dr. Poston began treating her.
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Claimant's

deposition was taken in the fall
was living independently with

2010. In her deposition she was asked to describe a typical day.
fiance. She talked about arising at about 6: 15 AM, getting

the children ready for school, getting them fed and then driving them to school. Thereafter she
would deal with any errands she might have such as shopping, house cleaning, taking care of things
outside the home, paying bills etc. Sometimes she would then go to visit with family or friends or
they would come visit her. She might go for a walk. When the kids got out of school she would go
pick them up. If the kids stayed at her house she would watch them. Sometimes they would play at a
friend's house. Sometimes the friends would play at her house. After her fiance got home from
work she would cook dinner then they would relax for a while, and perhaps watch TV. She would
then get the kids showered and ready for bedtime. (Def s Ex. A pp.95-100).
At the time of the hearing in August 2013 Claimant was living with her parents, who were
essentially taking care of Claimant's children. Claimant testified at the hearing that she now stays up
most all night tossing and turning because she can't get comfortable (Tr. p.74). When she gets out
of bed in the morning she takes her medication. She described the effect of the medication. She
explained "but as soon as I take my medication, it starts kicking in. I feel completely wiped out. I'm
dizzy." (Tr. 76). Claimant's mother described her condition in testimony at the hearing. Claimant
seldom leaves the house. (Tr. p. 27). Claimant takes from four to six hot baths a day. (Tr. 25). If she
is at all active, she ends up "paying for it" by spending the whole next day in an out of the tub. (Tr.
p.27).
At the time of the hearing Claimant was on hydrocodone (opioid pain medication),
gabapentin (for nerve pain), fluroxetine, (an anti-depressant), cyclobenzaprine (muscle relaxant),
Desipramine (another anti-depressant), Lunesta (for sleep) and Diclofenac (an anti-inflammatory).
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Dr. Poston apparently has Claimant convincP..<l that her condition is permanent and
worsen and that she will continue to need his care. She testified:
"And, you know, he said there is nothing they can really do other
than to treat it and continue to treat it. It is not going to get better. It
is going to continuously get worse... They can only manage the
pain." (Tr. p 6611 10-18).
During the course of the iitigation, Ciaimant was seen for independent medicai examinations
arranged by her attorneys. On August 26, 2009 Claimant was seen by Dr. Gary Cook, a retired
anesthesiologist, in an evaluation arranged by her attorneys. Dr. Cook recommended "no further
narcotics use." (Ex. 10 p.13). More recently, Claimant was seen by Dr. Brett Bender of Hamilton
Montana, for an evaluation arranged by her attorneys. Dr. Bender is associated with the Montana
Spine and Pain Institute. He recommended "strong consideration of a gradual taper of opioid
medication." He was in favor of Claimant attending a pain management program for that purpose,
such as the program offered at Montana Spine and Pain Institute. (Ex. 18 pp. I 0, 16).
Despite these recommendations, at the time of the hearing Claimant was continuing to
receive her medications through Dr. Poston. (Tr. p.88). Claimant has not pursued any type of rehab
programs to get her off the medications. (Tr. p.115). She acknowledged that she is less functional
now than she was before she started treating with Dr. Poston. (Tr. p.113 ).

It should be mentioned that Claimant had an additional orthopedic examination of her knee
in October 2013. On October 29, 2013 she saw orthopedic surgeon Jason Dalling MD of Idaho
Falls. Dr. Dalling reviewed Claimant's diagnostic studies and examined her. He recommended
some exercises to strengthen Claimant's legs and specifically noted that he was "extremely hesitant"
to discuss surgical options. (Ex. 3 pp. 29-31 ).
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IL ARGUMENT
A. The Standard of Review:
On an appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court's review is limited by the Idaho
Constitution. Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9. That provision limits the Court's jurisdiction. Fife v.

The Home Depot, Inc., 151 Idaho 509, 513, 260 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2011 ); McAlpin v. Wood River
Med. Ctr., 129 Idaho 1, 3,921 P.2d 178, 180 (1996); Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins.
Co., 105 Idaho 133, 136, 666 P.2d 1144, 1147 (1983).
Accordingly, although the Court exercises free review over questions of law, its review
of factual findings of the Commission is limited to a determination of whether the Commission's
factual findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Warren v. Williams &

Parsons P.C. CPA 's, 157 Idaho 528,534, 337 P.3d 1257, 1263 (2014) citing Knowlton v. Wood
River Med. Ctr. 151 Idaho 135, 140, 254 P.2d 36, 41 (2011). "Substantial and competent
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."

McNulty v. Sinclair Oil Corp. 152 Idaho 582, 584-5, 272 P.3d 554, 556-57 (2012). "Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance." Zapata v. JR. Simplot

Co., 132 Idaho 513,515,975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). On appeal, the Court does not re-weigh
the evidence, and "[t]he Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of
evidence will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous." Knowlton, 151 Idaho at 140,
254 P .3d at 41. All facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the party who
prevailed before the Commission. Zapata, 132 Idaho at 515, 975 P.2d at 1180. In this case it is
the Defendants, as the prevailing parties below, who are entitled to have the facts and inferences
viewed in the light most favorable to them.
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The sole issue on appeal is the issue of Claimant's entitlement to additional medical
treatment after she became
preponderance of the evidence

stable. Claimant bore the burden of proving, by a
Defendants were responsible for the additional treatment

This required proof that the treatment was reasonable and necessary and proof that the need for
the treatment was causally related to the industrial accident. Chavez v. Stokes, _Idaho_,
353 P.3d 414 (2015). A Claimant, who has previously received benefits and is seeking benefits
for additional medical care allegedly caused by an industrial accident, still has the burden of
proving that the need for the additional medical care was caused by the accident. Gomez v. Dura
Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 601, 273 P.3d 569, 573 (2012); Walters v. All Phase Const., 156
Idaho 259,332 P.3d 992 (2014).
The essence of this appeal is Claimant's contention that the Commission erred in not
requiring the Defendants to pay for additional medical treatment. Although Claimant's Brief
suggests that the Commission misinterpreted recent case authority, the real contention in this
appeal is a factual one; Claimant believes that the Commission should have found that she was
entitled to additional treatment. This is a question of fact on which this Court's review is limited
to a determination of the existence of substantial and competent evidence supporting the
Commission's finding. Chavez, supra.
To resolve the medical issue, the Commission and its Referee reviewed and weighed
conflicting lay and expert evidence, including a variety of medical expert testimony and written
evidence. This is the function of the Industrial Commission. It acts as a factfinder and is free to
determine the weight to be given to the testimony of a medical expert. Eacret v. Clearwater
Forest Indus., 136 Idaho 733, 737, 40 P.3d 91, 95 (2002). "It is the role of the Industrial
Commission, not this Court, to determine the weight and credibility of testimony and to resolve
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conflicting interpretations of testimony." Henderson, 142 Idaho at 565, 130 P.3d at 1103. "On
Court will not conduct a de novo review of the evidence or consider whether it
would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented." Lopez v. State, 136
Idaho 174, 178, 30 P.3d 952, 956 (2001), quoted in Walters, supra, 156 Idaho at 262, 322 P.3d at
995.

B. Some Perspective on Claimant's Condition and Her Claim
The members of this Court have surely read of the problems caused by recent dramatic
increases in the usage of prescription opioid pain medications. In May of 2014 a spokesman for
the National Institute on Drug Abuse, a component of the National Institutes of Health made a
presentation to a Senate committee, in which it was estimated that between 26.4 million and 36
million people worldwide, with an estimated 2.1 million people in the United States suffered
from substance abuse disorders related to prescription opioid pain medications.2 Claimant
Channel Rish is one of those individuals. She is "habituated" (the doctors don't like the term
"addicted") to narcotic pain medications. She does not get her narcotics on the street. She gets
them from a pharmacy with prescriptions authored at her physician's office. The physician who
now supervises her treatment, Jason Poston M.D. has convinced her that she will not get better
and will only get worse. (Tr. p. 66). She is convinced that she needs her medications to deal with
her pain, yet there really isn't a physical explanation for her continuing pain complaints. The
damage done to Claimant by this "treatment" was apparent from the evidence presented at the
hearing and was recognized by the Referee and the Commission. (R. pp.37-38).
This should not be read as suggesting that Claimant is an innocent victim in this
circumstance. To the contrary, she is aware that the consensus of medical opinion is that she
2

National Institute on Drug Abuse, America's Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and Prescription Drug Abuse,
presented by Nora D. Volkow M.D., May 14, 2014.
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needs to be weaned from narcotic pam medications. As the Referee and the Commission
recognized, Claimant has sabotaged attempts to wean

the medications. (R. p. 42). In

fact, when Defendants ceased paying for Claimant's treatment she was able to get off of opioid
medications, only to later resume taking them. (Tr. p. 108). The Referee and the Commission
found from a review of all of the evidence that Claimant's continued addiction was not a
compensable consequence of her knee injury. (R. p. 42).
So, from the outset, it is important to note that the medical treatment at issue in this
appeal has not been of any help to Claimant. The Industrial Commission has held that the
treatment has actually been harmful to Claimant. (R. p. 41, LC. Decision p. 32, para. 128). There
is no longer any dispute about that. Appellant's Opening Brief now concedes that the treatment
at issue was harmful. "Claimant does not dispute the Referee's finding expressed at page 32 of
the Decision, paragraph 128, where the Referee concluded:
'She suffered, at most, a minor strain. However, extensive medical
treatment, including three arthroscopic surgeries and several
injections have produced a harmful result. ... ' "
(Appellant's Opening Brief pp.2-3).
It is equally important to note that the treatment in question is treatment that has already
been received by Claimant, through Medicaid. Claimant is not asserting that she is entitled to
future treatment, only treatment that has already been received. There is no indication that
Claimant has any out-of-pocket expenses for this treatment. If we all agree that the treatment
received was not helpful and this treatment was provided without any direct cost to Claimant,
then what is it that motivates this appeal? Why is Claimant seeking to hold the Employer and
Surety responsible for the failed treatment? What difference does it make to her whether the
Defendants are required to pay for this past treatment through the workers' compensation claim?
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What does she have to gain? Although the answers to these questions may not be it critical to
resolving this appeal, it may benefit the Court to understand, in a practical sense, why we are
here on appeal. The answer can likely be found in this Court's opinion in Neel v. Western
Construction Inc. 147 Idaho 146, 206 P.3d 852 (2009), and in the way it has been interpreted

since it was issued. Should Claimant prevail on this appeal, under the authority of the Neel
decision, she will seek recovery of the medical expenses at "full invoiced rates;" i.e. the rates
billed by the providers - not the lower rates actually paid by Medicaid. If Defendants are found
responsible for the treatment, they must make payment to Claimant and her attorneys, not
directly to the medical providers or to Medicaid. Edmondson v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, 130 Idaho 108, 937 P.2d 420 (1997). The medical providers, having accepted Medicaid

payments, are prohibited by federal law from receiving any further payment, even from a 3rd
party recovery. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (25) (c); 42 C.F.R. § 447.15; Rybicki v. Hartley, 792 F.2d
260, 261 (1st Cir. 1986); Evanston Hospital v. Hauck, 1 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 1993) and Lizer v.
Eagle Air Med Corp., 308 F.Supp2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2004). Therefore, the Defendants would pay

"full invoiced rates," but Medicaid would be reimbursed at much lesser rates. The difference
between the Medicaid reimbursement and the amount actually billed by the providers is then
available to be split between Claimant and her attomey. 3 This is the practical effect of the Neel
decision and the prospect of this recovery is probably what motivates this appeal.
C. The Commission Did Not Misinterpret Chavez v. Stokes

Claimant's brief argues that the Industrial Commission misinterpreted this Court's recent
opinion in Chavez v. Stokes, supra. In fact, it is Claimant that is misinterpreting the opinion. This
Court's opinion in Chavez was issued before the Industrial Commission's decision in this case.
3

In this case the difference between "full invoiced rates" and the amount that would need to be repaid to Medicaid
may actually exceed $100,000. (see Ex. P).
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The Referee and the Commission were aware of the Chavez decision; the case is cited in the
Commission decision. (R. p. 36). As the court will recall, Chavez overruled the earlier
decision in Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 779 P.2d 395 (1989).
Sprague dealt with the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment provided under a

workers' compensation claim. Under the facts of Sprague, the court had used three factors to
determine the reasonableness of treatment.

In a subsequent case, Hipwell v. Challenger Pallet

and Supply, 124 Idaho 294, 859 P.2d 330 (1993) the three factors referred to in Sprague evolved

into a "test" to be used in approaching the question of whether treatment was reasonable. The
lesson of the Chavez case was that Sprague 's three factors were not meant to be used as an
"ironclad test" of reasonableness. Chavez, 353 P.3d at 419. After Chavez the Commission was
instead to utilize a "totality of the circumstances approach" to a determination of whether
specific medical treatment was reasonable. The Court cautioned that it was hesitant to provide
specific factors for utilization in the Commission's fact-finding approach, out of concern that
those factors might later be interpreted as definitive, as had been done with Sprague. (Id.).
As noted, the Referee and the Commission recognized the significance of the Chavez
decision and based its decision regarding Claimant's entitlement to medical treatment on "the
totality of facts and circumstances .... " (R. p. 38). Simply put, the Commission followed the
Court's directive announced in Chavez.
In her argument to this Court, Claimant wants to seize upon some dicta in the Chavez
decision (from a Justice Bistline dissent in Hipwell) cautioning against "armchair doctoring"
with the benefit of hindsight. Chavez, 353 P.3d at 419. Claimant would interpret these comments
as meaning that the Court has adopted a specific rule in Chavez prohibiting any retrospective
review of whether medical treatment was helpful to a Claimant. Such an interpretation was
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surely not intended by the Court, as this would conflict with the overall premise that the
Commission was to

able to utilize the totality of the circumstances in evaluating the medical

treatment. Such an interpretation would also conflict with the Court's reluctance to identify
specific factors, lest they come to be misinterpreted as hard and fast rules. The Court in Chavez
surely did not intend to preclude any consideration of the actual result of the treatment in
question. That wouldn't make sense.
In some cases, the Commission will be required to make a prospective review of the
reasonableness of medical treatment. Sometimes, particularly with questioned surgeries, the
Commission will be called on to address "reasonableness" in advance of the treatment. On other
occasions the circumstances of the case may dictate that the Commission will have the benefit of
a retrospective view. Post Chavez it is true that in the right case, medical treatment might be
considered "reasonable" even though a patient might not make "gradual improvement from the
treatment." This factor is no longer a hard and fast requirement under a Sprague test. However,
the result of the treatment, in appropriate cases can and should be considered as part of the
totality of the circumstances. In some cases, it may be the best evidence of reasonableness.
To the extent that Claimant would read Chavez as precluding any consideration of the
result of medical treatment, this would be a misinterpretation. The Commission recognized the
court's holding in Chavez and applied it, in basing the decision on all facts and circumstances
relating to the medical treatment in question.
Moreover, with regard to the contested treatment - continuing narcotics and a spinal
stimulator implant - it makes no difference in the result whether the analysis is prospective or
retrospective. Under any approach there was substantial and competent evidence supporting the
Commission's factual finding that this "treatment" was not reasonable.
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D. The Commission's Finding on Medical Treatment is Supported by Substantial and
Competent Evidence.
At this point, it is probably appropriate to remind the Court that Claimant no longer
disputes that the treatment in question in this appeal was not helpful to her and was in fact
"harmful" to her. Claimant is seeking to recover from these Defendants the cost of failed
treatment that she has already received. The treatment in question is principally continuing
medication therapies, particularly narcotics and the "big-ticket item" which is the cost of an
implanted spinal cord stimulator. As discussed above, obviously neither of these therapies have
been of help to Claimant in restoring her function. So, with the benefit of a retrospective view,
there's no question at all that the treatment was not reasonable. Apparently, Claimant would
concede this. (see Claimant's Opening Brief, pp.2-3).
Rather than arguing that the treatment actually helped Claimant in any objective way, the
argument is that the Commission should not have even considered the poor results from the
treatment. As discussed above, Claimant is arguing for a misinterpretation of the Chavez
decision. But, even if we assume that any retrospective analysis is off-limits, there is more than
ample support for the finding that the treatment was not reasonable. Before the Employer and
Surety ceased paying for Claimant's medication therapies in the summer of 2009, at least three
medical doctors and a psychologist had opined that Claimant was not benefiting from continued
opioid medications and should be taken off of them. The evidence of this is found in this record
in the reports of Drs. Christian Gussner and Robert Friedman from January 9th and 10th of 2008,
(Defs Ex. L), the reports of Dr. Gussner and Dr. McClay from January 2009 (Defs Ex.Land
M, respectively) and the records of Claimant's treating pain management specialist at the time,
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Holly Zoe MD (Ex. 6 p.75). The need for Claimant to be off of the narcotics was confirmed by
IME physician Dr. Gary Cook in August 2009.
fact,

lOp.13).

one were to exclude any sort of retrospective analysis, at the time the

Defendants ceased paying for Claimant's narcotics, there was no physician recommending that
narcotic therapy be continued. The Commission's finding that it was not unreasonable for the
Defendants to cease paying for Claimant's medication therapies is more than amply supported by
the record, regardless of whether one takes a prospective or retrospective view of that decision.
The same can be said for the Defendants' decision not to pay for the spinal cord
stimulator implant. On September 4, 2007 Dr. Zoe, who was then treating Claimant, was having
difficulty explaining Claimant's ongoing pain complaints. Dr. Zoe wrote: "I don't feel that spinal
cord stimulation will be a success for her mechanical pain, although I am willing to try, but the
success rate probably will be low." (Ex. 6 p. 12). Drs. Gussner and Friedman both specifically
recommended against spinal stimulation and other invasive therapies in their reports in January
2008. (Defs Ex. L). Dr. Gussner again recommended against spinal stimulation in January 2009
(Id) as did Dr. McClay, who rather forcefully suggested that Claimant would best be served by

being "out of the workers' compensation process as quickly as possible." (Defs. Ex. M p.318).
Even if we ignore the fact that the spinal stimulator has not been beneficial, and just take a
prospective view, the foregoing opinions existed before the device was implanted at Dr. Poston's
suggestion in January 2011. Again, there is clearly substantial and competent evidence to support
the Industrial Commission's factual finding that the Defendants did not have a responsibility for
providing this therapy.
Claimant's argument for recovery of the costs of the spinal stimulator focuses almost
exclusively on a single statement made by Dr. Gary Walker in his post-hearing deposition. Dr.
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Walker's statement needs to be understood in context. He had seen Claimant for an independent
medical examination and had authored reports supporting

Defendants' position with regard to

narcotic medications and the spinal stimulator. (Exs E & L). As regards narcotics, he stated "I do
not see the need for any ongoing medical treatment other than weaning off of her narcotics." (Ex.
L). When he examined Claimant he found no evidence of CRPS - the condition for which the
stimulator had supposedly been implanted. (Depo. Dr. Walker p. 10; Ex.Np. 335).

In fact, in

his practice he had never seen spinal stimulation attempted as a remedy for knee pain. (Ex. N p.
336). He acknowledged that spinal stimulation may have place in treatment of CRPS, but he
testified that in his practice he has treated hundreds of patients with sports injuries and knee
related injuries and he had never seen findings of CRPS localized to the knee. (Depo. Dr. Walker
p. 31). From his review of Claimant's medical records and his examination of her he really
didn't find any reason for her continuing pain complaints. (Depo. Dr. Walker pp. 9-10). In fact,
he had opined that continuing narcotic therapies and the spinal stimulator were "not workrelated." (Ex. E).
During Dr. Walker's post-hearing deposition, he was read a statement from a chart note
of Dr. Poston in which Dr. Poston had recorded findings consistent with CRPS. He was asked
whether he had any reason to disagree with Dr. Poston's observations. Dr. Walker indicated that
he couldn't disagree with Dr. Poston's findings - because he wasn't there. (Depo. Dr. Walker,
pp. 24-25). Dr. Walker did note that Dr. Poston's findings in regard to CRPS symptoms were
not consistent in Dr. Poston's records. (Id at p.27) and he had found no such findings in his own
examination of Claimant. (Id at p.10). When Dr. Walker was asked in his deposition to express
his opinion as to whether spinal stimulation was reasonable and necessary as a result of
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Claimant's knee injury, he did show some reluctance to criticize Dr. Poston - and this is the
source of the one sentence from his testimony that is quoted in Claimant's brief. He testified:
Q. Do you have any opinions as to whether that treatment [spinal
stimulation] was reasonable and necessary as a result of the knee
. .

?

lllJUry . ...

A. Yeah. Yeah. Again, based on what I was seeing at the time I
saw the patient, I would say no. Based on her response to the
stimulator and how her pain has not changed, I would say no.

Based on his [Dr. Poston's] statement on that one note of his exam
findings and doing a trial and her getting some positive response to
a trial, it seems at the time it was maybe a reasonable thing to do.
(Depo. Dr. Walker p. 44 II. 4-11 ).
This is the statement that becomes the center-piece of Claimant's argument. In the
briefing Claimant asserts that Dr. Walker "expressly declared during his deposition that Dr.
Poston's prescribing a spinal cord stimulator was reasonable." (Appellant's Opening Brief p.
12). Understood in context, that is not true at all. In essence, what Dr. Walker was saying is that
when one examines all of the facts and circumstances, the treatment was not reasonable, but if
confined to consideration of only one chart note of Dr. Poston and Claimant's positive report
following a trial of spinal stimulation, then "maybe" it could be considered reasonable. This
comment from Dr. Walker probably doesn't even meet the standard for admissibility; i.e., an
opinion expressed to a reasonable degree of medical probability. However, it is the best that
Claimant has and so she fashions her argument from it.
Defendants would offer two additional comments with regard to Claimant's reliance on
this statement of Dr. Walker.

First, Dr. Walker's testimony was taken into account by the

Referee and the Commission along with all of the other medical evidence. Dr. Walker's
testimony is discussed at some length in the Commission's decision in paragraphs 81 through 85.

DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 22

(R. pp.28-30).

The testimony, which was supportive of the Defendants' position, was

appropriately considered

the Referee and the Commission along with the records and

testimony of all of the lay and expert witnesses. Claimant's argument attempts to selectively
extract one sentence, out of context and have this Court reject the Commission's fact-finding
based on that one comment.

This is an invitation that the Court should decline. The clear

weight of the evidence, including the evidence from Dr. Walker supports the Commission's
determination that the additional treatment was not reasonable and that the Defendants did not
have a responsibility for it.
Finally, there is some irony in Claimant's argument based on the one statement of Dr.
Walker.

Claimant's legal argument seems to be that Commission shouldn't employ a

retrospective analysis that takes into account the actual effect of the medical treatment. Yet, Dr.
Walker's statement, on which Claimant wants to rely, is itself a retrospective view (speculation
really) of what Dr. Poston may have been thinking years earlier.
The truth is, this never was a close case on the issue of the reasonableness of the medical
treatment Claimant received after the Defendants ceased paying for her care. The thorough
review of the evidence performed by the Referee and the Commission resulted in a decision that
very candidly recognized that the treatment in question was not reasonable, has not been
beneficial to Claimant and in fact has been harmful to her. The Commission applied the correct
standard in considering all of the facts and circumstances relating to the treatment in question.
The factual decisions of the Referee and the Commission are clearly supported by substantial and
competent evidence. There is no basis for this Court to reverse the Commission's decision with
regard to these failed therapies. The Commission's decision should be affirmed.
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E. The Argument Regarding Dr. Burks is a Red Herring
Claimant's brief contains references to a medical referral for Claimant to see an
orthopedic surgeon at the University of Utah, a Dr. Burks. The argument seems to be that the
Defendants unreasonably denied an evaluation by this physician and that this should somehow
be the basis for an attorney fee award to Claimant (Appellant's Opening Brief p.14). Claimant
raised the same argument below; i.e., she used the referral to Dr. Burks as the basis for an
attorney fee claim. However, Claimant didn't ask the Commission to order the Defendants to
provide an examination by this doctor and she's not asking this Court to do so. After Defendants
ceased paying for Claimants treatment, she was evaluated by two orthopedic surgeons, but she
didn't choose to see Dr. Burks.

The record really doesn't contain much information about this

fellow's credentials and why he was thought to be the potential solution for Claimant's problem.
Evidently, he is a sports medicine physician associated with the University of Utah. We might
have some additional information about him had there been an actual effort to have Claimant
seen by that physician. But, that didn't occur and consequently we are left to guess as to what he
might have added to the situation.
We do know that Appellant's Opening Brief does not accurately summarize the state of
the evidence with regard to the referral to this physician. The brief states that "the doctors"
unanimously agreed on the referral and the Defendants denied the referral without any
supporting medical advice. (Appellant's Brief pp.9-10). This is incorrect.
The referral to Dr. Burks originated with Claimant's treating orthopedic surgeon Dr.
Huntsman. He had done three arthroscopic surgeries and had failed to find any reason for
Claimant's continuing complaints. On November 29, 2007 he was finished treating Claimant
and was passing her along when the recommendation was made for a "second opinion." (Ex 3.

DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS' BRJEF- 24

Actually, this would have been a "third opinion" because Dr. Huntsman had asked his
orthopedic surgeon Gregory Biddulph MD to assist him with the third and final surgery
had done on Claimant's knee. (Ex. 5 pp.4-5). Presumably this was to see if Dr. Biddulph
could find any reason for Claimant's continuing complaints. After that surgery and before
terminating his involvement with Claimant, Dr. Huntsman authored a chart note on October 4,
2007 in which he recommended an independent medical evaluation and stated "I definitely do
not think any more surgery would be beneficial for her." (Ex. 3 p.26). With this
recommendation, the workers' compensation surety set up independent medical examinations
with Drs. Gussner and Friedman. When Dr. Gussner saw Claimant, he wrote an initial report that
concurred with the recommendation for an evaluation by Dr. Burks. (Ex. L). Dr. Friedman
disagreed with his colleague as to whether such a referral was appropriate.

Dr. Friedman

believed that Claimant had had a thorough workup that had not disclosed any physical problems
to explain the pain complaints. (Id) The two of them subsequently got together and wrote a
consensus report in which they agreed that it might be reasonable for Claimant to see this doctor,
but the need would not have resulted from the industrial injury. (Id). Accordingly, it is
misleading to suggest or imply that all of the doctors were in favor of the Defendants providing
the orthopedic referral.
In any event, the issues as to another orthopedic evaluation are now moot. Since the
referral to Dr. Burks was recommended, Claimant has gone on to have two additional
independent orthopedic surgeons evaluate her knee. As discussed above, she was seen by Dr.
John Liljenquist in July 2010 (Ex 9 pp.1-2) and by Dr. Jason Dalling in October 2013. (Ex. 3

pp.29-32). Neither of these doctors saw any indications for additional orthopedic surgery and
neither of them suggested that there would be any benefit to seeing yet another orthopedist.
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There is no indication that Claimant has made any additional effort to see the University of Utah
physician. Frankly, when one reviews the course of Claimant's treatment, it is fairly apparent
that the last thing she needs is to see another orthopedic surgeon.
III. CONCLUSION
The Referee and to the Industrial Commission sorted through and considered all of the
lay and expert testimony and other evidence submitted by both the Claimant and the Defendants.
The Commission applied the appropriate legal analysis, judging the reasonableness of Claimant's
medical treatment under a "totality of the circumstances" standard. Claimant's evidence simply
failed to convince the Referee and the Commission that her continuing use of narcotic pain
medications and the expensive spinal stimulator implant were reasonable therapies for
Claimant's condition. The reasonableness of the treatment is a question of fact and the
Commission's resolution of that question is to stand unless this Court should determine that there
is a lack of substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's finding. Clearly,
substantial and competent evidence exists to support the Commission's finding. The thorough
decision of the Referee and the Commission discusses this evidence in detail.
These Defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm the decision of the Industrial
Commission.
Respectfully submitted this -Z..~ay of March, 2016.
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP

<==:;~~
Attorneys for Respondents (Employer/Surety)
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